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Abstract
This paper reports on the design and soundness proof, using the
Coq proof assistant, of Verasco, a static analyzer based on abstract
interpretation for most of the ISO C 1999 language (excluding re-
cursion and dynamic allocation). Verasco establishes the absence
of run-time errors in the analyzed programs. It enjoys a modular
architecture that supports the extensible combination of multiple
abstract domains, both relational and non-relational. Verasco inte-
grates with the CompCert formally-verified C compiler so that not
only the soundness of the analysis results is guaranteed with math-
ematical certitude, but also the fact that these guarantees carry over
to the compiled code.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Software Engineer-
ing]: Software/Program Verification—Assertion checkers, Correct-
ness proofs; F.3.1 [Logics and meanings of programs]: Specifying
and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs—Mechanical verifi-
cation
Keywords static analysis; abstract interpretation; soundness
proofs; proof assistants
1. Introduction
Verification tools are increasingly used during the development and
validation of critical software. These tools provide guarantees that
are always independent from those obtained by more conventional
means such as testing and code review; often stronger; and some-
times cheaper to obtain (rigorous testing can be very expensive).
Verification tools are based on a variety of techniques such as static
analysis, model checking, deductive program proof, and combina-
tions thereof. The guarantees they provide range from basic mem-
ory safety to full functional correctness. In this paper, we focus on
static analyzers for low-level, C-like languages that establish the
absence of run-time errors such as out-of-bound array accesses,
null pointer dereference, and arithmetic exceptions. These basic
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properties are essential both for safety and security. Among the var-
ious verification techniques, static analysis is perhaps the one that
scales best to large existing code bases, with minimal intervention
from the programmer.
Static analyzers can be used in two different ways: as sophis-
ticated bug finders, discovering potential programming errors that
are hard to find by testing; or as specialized program verifiers, es-
tablishing that a given safety or security property holds with high
confidence. For bug-finding, the analysis must be precise (too many
false alarms render the tool unusable for this purpose), but no guar-
antee is offered nor expected that all bugs of a certain class will be
found. For program verification, in contrast, soundness of the anal-
ysis is paramount: if the analyzer reports no alarms, it must be the
case that the program is free of the class of run-time errors tracked
by the analyzer; in particular, all possible execution paths through
the program must be accounted for.
To use a static analyzer as a verification tool, and obtain certi-
fication credit in regulations such as DO-178C (avionics) or Com-
mon Criteria (security), evidence of soundness of the analyzer must
therefore be provided. Owing to the complexity of static analyzers
and of their input data (programs written in “big” programming
languages), rigorous testing of a static analyzer is very difficult.
Even if the analyzer is built on mathematically-rigorous grounds
such as abstract interpretation [14], the possibility of an implemen-
tation bug remains. The alternative we investigate in this paper is
deductive formal verification of a static analyzer : we apply pro-
gram proof, mechanized with the Coq proof assistant, to the imple-
mentation of a static analyzer in order to prove its soundness with
respect to the dynamic semantics of the analyzed language.
Our analyzer, called Verasco, is based on abstract interpreta-
tion; handles most of the ISO C 1999 language, with the exception
of recursion and dynamic memory allocation; combines several ab-
stract domains, both non-relational (integer intervals and congru-
ences, floating-point intervals, points-to sets) and relational (con-
vex polyhedra, symbolic equalities); and is entirely proved to be
sound using the Coq proof assistant. Moreover, Verasco is con-
nected to the CompCert C formally-verified compiler [26], ensur-
ing that the safety guarantees established by Verasco carry over to
the compiled code.
Mechanizing soundness proofs of verification tools is not a
new idea. It has been applied at large scale to Java type-checking
and bytecode verification [25], proof-carrying code infrastructures
[1, 12], and verification condition generators for C-like languages
[20, 23], among other projects. The formal verification of static an-
alyzers based on dataflow analysis or abstract interpretation is less
developed. As detailed in section 10, earlier work in this area either
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Figure 1. Modular architecture of the Verasco static analyzer
focuses on simple static analyses (dataflow analyses, no widening,
non-relational domains only) or on mini-languages such as IMP.
Compared with this earlier work on verified static analyzers, Ve-
rasco is a quantitative jump: the source language analyzed (most
of C) is much more complex, and the static analysis technique used
(combination of several abstract domains, including relational do-
mains) is much more sophisticated.
This paper reports on the design and Coq verification of the
Verasco static analyzer. In addition to the the quantitative jump
mentioned above, we emphasize as a contribution the modular
architecture of the analyzer and its verification, including fully-
specified interfaces for the various components that makes it easy
to connect new abstract domains to Verasco, as well as to reuse
Verasco’s domains in other projects. The full Coq development is
available at http://compcert.inria.fr/verasco/.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the gen-
eral architecture of the analyzer. The next five sections give more
details on the source language (§3), the abstract interpreter (§4), the
state and memory abstraction (§5), the numerical abstract domains
(§6) and how multiple domains communicate (§7). We finish by
some notes on the Coq development (§8), preliminary experimen-
tal results (§9), discussion of related work (§10), and conclusions
and perspectives (§11).
2. Architecture of the analyzer
The general architecture of the Verasco analyzer is depicted in fig-
ure 1. It is inspired by that of ASTRE´E [6] and is structured in three
layers. At the top sits the abstract interpreter that infers abstract
states at every program point and checks for potential run-time er-
rors, raising alarms along the way. The abstract interpreter oper-
ates over the C#minor intermediate language described in section 3.
This language is the second intermediate language in the CompCert
compilation pipeline. The Verasco analyzer reuses the CompCert
front-end to produce C#minor from the source C code. The seman-
tics preservation theorem of CompCert guarantees that any safety
property established on the C#minor intermediate language carries
over to the assembly code generated by CompCert. Combining this
theorem with the soundness theorem for Verasco, we obtain that
any C#minor program that passes analysis without raising an alarm
compiles to assembly code that is free of run-time errors. The Ve-
rasco abstract interpreter proceeds by fixpoint iteration that follows
the structure of the C#minor program. Section 4 gives more details
on this abstract interpreter and its soundness proof.
The middle layer of Verasco is an abstract domain for execu-
tion states, tracking the values of program variables, the contents
of memory locations, and the chain of function calls. This state
abstract domain is described in section 5. It is a parameter of the
abstract interpreter, and has a well-defined interface (in terms of ab-
stract operations provided and their specifications) outlined below.
This parameterization makes it possible to experiment with sev-
eral state domains of various precision, even though we currently
have only one implementation of the state domain. Concerning val-
ues that arise during program execution, the domain tracks pointer
values itself via points-to analysis, but delegates the tracking of nu-
merical values to a numerical domain (bottom layer).
At the bottom layer of Verasco, the numerical abstract domain
is itself an extensible combination of several domains. Some are
non-relational, such as intervals and congruences, and track prop-
erties of the (integer or floating-point) value of a single program
variable or memory cell. Others are relational, such as convex poly-
hedra and symbolic equalities, and track relations between the val-
ues of several variables or cells. Two domain transformers perform
adaptation over domains: the “NR → R” transformer gives a re-
lational interface to a non-relational domain, and the “Z → int”
transformer handles the overflow and wrap-around behaviors that
occur when mathematical integers (type Z) and their arithmetic op-
erations are replaced by machine integers (n-bit vectors) and their
modulo-2n arithmetic. Section 6 describes these abstract domains
and their verification; section 7 explains how they are combined
and how they can exchange information during analysis.
Supporting such a modular composition of formally-verified ab-
stract domains requires that they adhere to well-defined interfaces.
Figure 2 shows one of the three major interfaces used in Verasco
(slightly simplified), the one for “machine” relational domains that
acts as gateway between the numerical domains and the state do-
main. All Verasco interfaces are presented as Coq’s type classes.
A machine relational domain consists of a type t equipped with a
semi-lattice structure: a decidable ordering leb, a top element, a
join operation that returns an upper bound of its arguments (but
not necessarily the least upper bound), and a widen operation used
to accelerate the convergence of fixpoint iteration with widening.
There is no bottom element in Verasco’s domains: instead, when
we need to represent unreachability, we use the type t+⊥ that adds
a generic Bot element to the domain t.
The three most important operations are forget, assign and
assume. The forget x A operation removes all information asso-
ciated with the variable x in state A, simulating a nondeterministic
assignment to x. The type var of variables is another parameter of
the class: it can be instantiated by program variables or, as the state
abstract domain does, by abstract memory cells.
The assign x e A operation updates A to reflect the assign-
ment of expression e to variable x. Numerical expressions e are
built upon variables and constants using the arithmetic, logical and
comparison operators of C#minor. (They are similar to C#minor
expressions except that they do not feature memory loads and that
intervals can occur instead of numerical constants, capturing some
amount of nondeterminism.) When analyzing source-level assign-
ments, it is crucial that the numerical domains receive a numer-
ical expression as close as possible to the right-hand side of the
source-level assignment, typically the same expression modulo the
replacement of memory loads by variables representing the mem-
ory cells accessed; then, each domain can treat it to the best of
its abilities. For example, on treating x = y + z, an interval do-
main will simply set x to the sum of the intervals associated with y
Class ab_machine_env (t var: Type): Type :=
{ leb: t → t → bool
; top: t
; join: t → t → t
; widen: t → t → t
; forget: var → t → t+⊥
; assign: var → nexpr var → t → t+⊥
; assume: nexpr var → bool → t → t+⊥
; nonblock: nexpr var → t → bool
; concretize_int: nexpr var → t → int_set+>+⊥
; γ : t → ℘ (var→num_val)
; gamma_monotone: forall x y,
leb x y = true → γ x ⊆ γ y;
; gamma_top: forall x, x ∈ γ top;
; join_sound: forall x y,
γ x ∪ γ y ⊆ γ (join x y)
; forget_correct: forall x ρ n ab,
ρ ∈ γ ab →
(upd ρ x n) ∈ γ (forget x ab)
; assign_correct: forall x e ρ n ab,
ρ ∈ γ ab →
n ∈ eval_nexpr ρ e →
(upd ρ x n) ∈ γ (assign x e ab)
; assume_correct: forall e ρ ab b,
ρ ∈ γ ab →
of_bool b ∈ eval_nexpr ρ e →
ρ ∈ γ (assume e b ab)
; nonblock_correct: forall e ρ ab,
ρ ∈ γ ab →
nonblock e ab = true →
block_nexpr ρ e →
False
; concretize_int_correct: ∀ e ρ ab i,
ρ ∈ γ ab →
NVint i ∈ eval_nexpr ρ e →
i ∈ γ (concretize_int e ab)
}.
Figure 2. The interface for machine relational domains (slightly
simplified).
and z, while a polyhedral domain will record the two inequalities
x ≤ y+ z ∧ x ≥ y+ z.
Finally, assume e b A refines the abstract state A to reflect the
fact that expression e evaluates to the truth value b (either true
or false). It is used when analyzing conditional statements (if,
switch) to keep track of the value of the discriminating expression.
Two query operations are provided to help the abstract inter-
preter detect potential run-time errors and raise alarms appropri-
ately: nonblock e A returns true if e is guaranteed to evaluate
safely and false if it can cause a run-time error (such as a divi-
sion by zero) when evaluated in a concrete state matching A; and
concretize int e A returns the set of possible integer values for
the expression e that can be deduced from the information in ab-
stract state A.
The interface in figure 2 also specifies the soundness conditions
for the abstract operations above. The specification uses a con-
cretization function γ that maps abstract statesA to sets of concrete
environments var → num val mapping variables to values. Here,
values are the tagged union of 32-bit integers, 64-bit integers, and
double-precision floating-point numbers (IEEE754 binary64 for-
mat), that is, the numerical types offered by C#minor. As custom-
ary in Coq, the type ℘(t) of sets of t’s is encoded as t → Prop,
so that γ is really a two-place predicate relating abstract states and
concrete environments. The specification does not use a full Ga-
lois connection A −−→←−−γ
α
℘(C) because the abstraction function α
is problematic in a constructive logic such as Coq’s: first, it is not a
computable function as soon as the type C of concrete “things” is
infinite; second, for some domains, α is not well defined.1
The lack of an abstraction function α changes the style of
specification of abstract operators, focusing the specification on
soundness conditions and freeing us from the obligation to prove
relative optimality. For example, the specification of forget in
Galois-connection style would be
forget x A = α{ρ[x← v] | ρ ∈ γ(A), v ∈ Values}
Instead, in γ-only style we state soundness as
∀ρ, v, ρ ∈ γ(A)⇒ ρ[x← v] ∈ γ(forget x A)
(condition forget correct in figure 2). We could also state rela-
tive optimality using γ only:
∀A′, (∀ρ, v, ρ ∈ γ(A)⇒ ρ[x← v] ∈ γ(A′))
⇒ forget x A v A′
However, we elected to mechanize proofs of soundness only, leav-
ing relative optimality optional.
The other two major interfaces of Verasco are similar in spirit
to what is described above, with the following differences. The in-
terface for “ideal” numerical relational domains concretizes not to
machine numbers, but to the sum of mathematical integers (type
Z) and FP numbers. It also supports communication channels be-
tween domains, as described in section 7. The interface for abstract
execution states that mediates between the abstract interpreter and
the state domain uses full C#minor expressions, including memory
loads; adds abstract operations to handle memory stores and to push
and pop function calls in a call context; and concretizes to C#minor
memory states and local variable environments (section 5).
3. The C#minor language
C#minor is the second intermediate language in the CompCert
compilation pipeline, immediately preceding Cminor, the entry lan-
guage of the CompCert back-end described in [27]. Classically,
C#minor is structured in functions, statements, and expressions.
Expressions:
e ::= t reading a temporary variable
| &x address of a variable
| cst constants
| op1(e) | op2(e, e′) arithmetic operations| load(τ, e) memory load with size τ
Statements:
s ::= skip
| t := e assignment
| store(τ, e1, e2) memory store with size τ
| t := e(e1, . . . , en) function call
| (s1; s2) sequence
| if e s1 else s2 conditional
| loop s infinite loop
| block s
| exit n terminate n+ 1 enclosing blocks
| L : s define label L
| goto L jump to label L
| return | return e function return
1 For example, in the domain of linear rational inequalities, the set of pairs
{(x, y) | x2 + y2 ≤ 1} has no best approximation as a polyhedron [28].
Functions:
f ::= name (. . . pi . . .) {
vars . . . xi[sizei] . . . local variables
temps . . . ti . . . temporary variables
s function body
}
A program is composed of function definitions and global variable
declarations. Variables are of two kinds: addressable (their address
can be taken with the & operator) and temporary (not resident in
memory). Expressions have no side effects: assignments, memory
stores and function calls are statements. The arithmetic, logical,
comparison, and conversion operators are roughly those of C, but
without overloading: for example, distinct operators are provided
for integer multiplication and FP division. Likewise, there are no
implicit casts: all conversions between numerical types are explicit.
Statements offer both structured control and goto with labels.
C loops as well as break and continue statements are encoded as
infinite loops with a multi-level exit n that jumps to the end of the
(n+ 1)-th enclosing block.
The first passes of CompCert perform the following transfor-
mations to produce C#minor from C sources. First, side effects are
pulled outside of expressions, and temporaries are introduced to
hold their values. For example, z = f(x) + 2 * g(y) becomes
t1 = f(x); t2 = g(y); z = t1 + 2 * t2;
This transformation effectively picks one evaluation order among
the several orders allowed in C. Second, local variables of scalar
types whose addresses are never taken are “pulled out of memory”
and turned into temporaries. Third, all type-dependent behaviors
are made explicit: operator overloading is resolved, implicit con-
versions are materialized, and array and struct accesses become
load and store operations with explicit address computations.
Fourth and last, C loops are encoded using block and exit, as
outlined in [7].
The dynamic semantics of C#minor is given in small-step style
as a transition relation C ν→ C′ between configurations C. The
optional ν label is an observable event possibly produced by the
transition, such as accessing a volatile variable. A typical con-
figurationC comprises a statement s under consideration, a contin-
uation k that describes what to do when s terminates (e.g., “move
to the right part of a sequence”, “iterate a loop once more”, or
“return from current function”), and a dynamic state ρ mapping
temporaries to their values, local and global variables to their ad-
dresses, and memory cells to their contents. The continuation k en-
codes both a context (where does s occur in the currently-executing
function) and a call stack (the chain of pending function calls).
Some transition rules actually perform computations (e.g., an as-
signment); others are refocusing rules that change s and k to focus
on the next computation.
The transition rules for C#minor are omitted from this paper, but
resemble those for Cminor given in [27, section 4]. The semitone
difference between Cminor and C#minor is that every Cminor
function has exactly one addressable variable called the stack data
block, while a C#minor function has zero, one or several variables
bound to logically separated memory blocks.
4. The abstract interpreter
Exploring all execution paths of a program during static analysis
can be achieved in two ways: the control flow graph (CFG) ap-
proach and the structural approach. In the CFG approach, a control
flow graph is built with program points as nodes, and edges car-
rying elementary commands (assignments, tests, . . . ). The transfer
function T for the analysis is defined for elementary commands.
The analyzer, then, sets up a system of inequations
Ap′ w T c Ap where p c→ p′ is a CFG edge
with unknowns Ap, the abstract states associated to every program
point p. This system is then solved by global fixpoint iteration over
the whole CFG.
In contrast, the structural approach applies to languages with
structured control and compound statements such as if and loops.
There, the transfer function T is defined over basic as well as com-
pound statements: given the abstract stateA “before” the execution
of statement s, it returns T s A, the abstract state “after” the execu-
tion of s. For sequences, we have T (s1; s2) A = T s2 (T s1 A).
For loops, T takes a local fixpoint of the transfer function for the
loop body.
Since C#minor is a mostly structured language (only goto state-
ments are unstructured), the abstract interpreter for C#minor fol-
lows the structural approach. This obviates the need to define pro-
gram points for C#minor (a nontrivial task). Moreover, structural
abstract interpreters use less memory than CFG-based ones, main-
taining only a few different abstract states at any time, instead of
one per program point. However, the transfer function for our ab-
stract interpreter is more involved than usual, because control can
enter and leave a C#minor statement in several ways. The state-
ment s can be entered normally at the beginning, or via a goto
that branches to one of the labels defined in s. Likewise, s can ter-
minate either normally by running to the end, or prematurely by
executing a return, exit, or goto statement. Consequently, the
transfer function is of the form
T s (Ai, Al) = (Ao, Ar, Ae, Ag)
where Ai (input) is the abstract state at the beginning of s, Ao
(output) is the abstract state after s terminates normally,Ar (return)
is the state if it returns, and Ae (exits) maps exit numbers to the
corresponding abstract states. The goto statements are handled by
two maps from labels to abstract states:Al (labels) andAg (gotos),
the first representing the states that can flow to a label defined in s,
the second representing the states at goto statements executed by s.
Figure 3 excerpts from the definition of T and shows all these
components in action.
The loop case computes a post-fixpoint with widening and
narrowing, starting at ⊥ and iterating at most Nwiden times. The
pfp iterator is, classically, defined as
pfp F A N =

> if N = 0
narrow F A Nnarrow if A w F A
pfp F (A∇ F A) (N − 1) otherwise
narrow F A N =

A if N = 0
narrow F (F A) (N − 1) if A w F A
A otherwise
Each iteration of pfp uses the widening operator∇ provided by
the abstract domain to speed up convergence. Once a post-fixpoint
is found, F is iterated up to Nnarrow times in the hope of finding a
smaller post-fixpoint.
In both widening and narrowing iterations, we use “fuel” N
to convince Coq that the recursions above are terminating, and to
limit analysis time. We did not attempt to prove termination of
iteration with widening: it would require difficult proofs over the
widening operators of all our abstract domains [35], for no gain in
soundness. Alternatively, we could delegate the computation of a
candidate post-fixpoint A to an untrusted iterator written in Caml,
then check A w F A in a verified Coq function. This would cost
one more invocation of the F function, and it is unclear how the
Caml implementation could be made more efficient than the pfp
function above, written and verified in Coq.
T (x := e) (Ai, Al) = (assign x e Ai,⊥,⊥,⊥)
T (s; s′) (Ai, Al) = (A
′
o, Ar unionsqA′r, Ae unionsqAe, Ag unionsqA′g) where
{
(Ao, Ar, Ae, Ag) = T s (Ai, Al)
(A′o, A
′
r, A
′
e, A
′
g) = T s
′ (Ao, Al)
T (if(e) s else s′) (Ai, Al) = T s (assume e true Ai, Al) unionsq T s′ (assume e false Ai, Al)
T (loop s) (Ai, Al) = (⊥, Ar, Ae, Ag) where (Ao, Ar, Ae, Ag) = pfp (λ(Xo, Xr, Xe, Xg). T s (Ai unionsqXo, Al)) ⊥ Nwiden
T (exit n) (Ai, Al) = (⊥,⊥, (λn′. if n′ = n then Ai else ⊥),⊥)
T (block s) (Ai, Al) = (Ao unionsqAe(0), Ar, (λn. Ae(n+ 1)), Ag) where (Ao, Ar, Ae, Ag) = T s (Ai, Al)
T (goto L) (Ai, Al) = (⊥,⊥,⊥, (λL′. if L′ = L then Ai else ⊥))
T (L : s) (Ai, Al) = T s (Ai unionsqAl(L), Al)
Figure 3. Representative cases of the C#minor abstract interpreter
Optionally, the abstract interpreter can unroll loops on the fly:
the N first iterations of the loop are analyzed independently in
sequence; the remaining iterations are analyzed with a pfp fixpoint.
This delays widening and gains precision. The unrolling factor N
is currently given by an annotation in the source code.
In addition to the analysis of loop statements, a post-fixpoint
is computed for every C#minor function to analyze goto state-
ments. This function-global iteration ensures that the abstract states
at goto statements are consistent with those assumed at the corre-
sponding labeled statements. In other words, if s is the body of a
function and T s (Ai, Al) = (Ao, Ar, Ae, Ag) is its analysis, the
analysis iterates untilAg(L) v Al(L) for every label L. When this
condition holds, the abstraction of the function maps entry state Ai
to exit state Ao unionsq Ar corresponding to the two ways a C#minor
function can return (explicitly or by reaching the end of the func-
tion body).
Concerning functions, the abstract interpreter reanalyzes the
body of a function at every call site, effectively unrolling the func-
tion definition on demand. We use fuel again to limit the depth of
function unrolling. Moreover, since the state abstract domain does
not handle recursion, it raises an alarm if a recursive call can occur.
The abstract interpreter is written in monadic style so that
alarms can be reported during analysis. We use a logging monad:
when an alarm is raised, it is collected in the log, but analysis
continues. This is better than stopping at the first alarm like an
error monad would do: often, widening reaches a state that causes
an alarm, but the subsequent narrowing steps cause this alarm to
go away.
The soundness proof for the abstract interpreter is massive,
owing to the complexity of the C#minor language. To keep the
proof manageable, we break it in two parts: 1- the definition and
soundness proof of a suitable Hoare logic for C#minor, and 2- a
proof that the abstract interpreter infers Hoare “triples” that are
valid in this logic.
We first explain the approach in a simplified case, that of the
IMP-like subset of C#minor, without goto, exit and return.
In this subset, statements can only be entered at the beginning
and exited at the end, and the transfer function is of the form
T s A = A′. Intuitively, we expect this transfer function to be
sound if, for any statement s and initial abstract state A such that
the analysis T s A raises no alarm, the execution of s started
in any concrete state ρ ∈ γ(A) does not go wrong, and if it
terminates in state ρ′, then ρ′ ∈ γ(T s A). The way we prove
this property is first to show that if the analysis T s A raises no
alarms, then the weak Hoare triple {γ(A)} s {γ(T s A)} can be
derived in an appropriate program logic [5]. Then, we show that this
program logic is sound with respect to the operational semantics of
the language: if {P} s {Q} can be derived in the logic, then the
execution of s, started in a state satisfying P , does not go wrong,
and if it terminates, it does so on a state satisfying Q.
The approach outlined above extends to the whole C#minor
language, but not without elbow grease. C#minor statements can
terminate in multiple ways: normally, or prematurely on an exit,
return or goto statement. They can also be entered in two ways:
at the beginning of the statement, or via a goto to a label defined
within. Consequently, our program logic for C#minor manipulates
Hoare “heptuples” of the form
{P, Pl} s {Q, Qr, Qe, Qg}
where P is the precondition if s is entered normally, Pl(L) the
precondition if s is entered by a goto L, Q the postcondition if
s terminates normally, Qr(v) the postcondition if s terminates by
a return of value v, Qe(i) the postcondition if s terminates by
exit(i), and Qg(L) the postcondition if s terminates by goto L.
We omit the rules of this program logic from this paper, as they
are similar to those of the program logics for Cminor and Clight by
Appel and Blazy [2, 3] (without the separation logic aspects).
THEOREM 1 (Soundness of the abstract interpreter). Assume that
the analysis T s (Ai, Al) returns (Ao, Ar, Ae, Ag) without raising
an alarm. Then, the heptuple
{γ(Ai), γ(Al)} s {γ(Ao), γ(Ar), γ(Ae), γ(Ag)}
is derivable in the C#minor program logic.
It remains to show the soundness of the program logic with re-
spect to the continuation-based small-step semantics of C#minor.
Taking inspiration from the work of Appel et al. on step-indexed
semantics [3, 4], we say that a configuration (s, k, ρ) is safe for n
steps if no sequence of at most n transitions starting from (s, k, ρ)
triggers a run-time error: it either performs n transitions or reaches
a final configuration after n′ < n transitions. We say that a con-
tinuation k is safe for n steps with respect to the postconditions
(Q, Qr, Qe, Qg) if:
Q ρ⇒ (skip, k, ρ) safe for n steps
Qr v ρ⇒ (return(v), k, ρ) safe for n steps
Qe i ρ⇒ (exit(i), k, ρ) safe for n steps
Qg L ρ⇒ (goto L, k, ρ) safe for n steps
We can then state and prove soundness of the C#minor program
logic as follows.
THEOREM 2 (Soundness of the program logic). Assume that the
heptuple {P, Pl} s {Q, Qr, Qe, Qg} is derivable in the program
logic. Further assume that k is safe for n steps with respect to
(Q, Qr, Qe, Qg). If ρ satisfies P , then (s, k, ρ) is safe for n steps.
Moreover, if ρ satisfies Pl L and L is the label of sub-statement s′
of s, in continuation k′ extending k, then (s′, k′, ρ) is safe for n
steps.
5. The state abstract domain
The state abstraction in Verasco tracks values contained both in
memory and in temporary variables. Each value is attached to an
abstract memory cell, or “cell” for short, representing one unit of
storage: either a temporary variable or a scalar part of a local or
global variable. A scalar part is either the whole variable if it is of
scalar type, or an element of scalar type in this variable (e.g., a field
in a structure, an element in an array). Therefore, a cell is given by
the kind and the name of the variable it belongs to, the name of the
function in which this variable is declared (unless it is global), and
an offset and a value size (unless it is a temporary variable).
Cells: c ::= temp(f, t) the temporary t in function f
| local(f, x, δ, τ) slice of size τ at offset δ in the
local variable x of function f
| global(x, δ, τ) slice of size τ at offset δ in the
global variable x
The state abstract domain interacts with three specific abstract
domains: an abstract value (tp, pt, nm) is a triple in types ×
points-to × num. First, type information is tracked for every
memory cell in order to disambiguate, when possible, the behavior
of C#minor operators. For example addition of integer or pointer
values has various behaviors depending on the actual types of its
arguments: adding two integers yields an integer; adding an integer
to a pointer yields a pointer in the same block; and adding two
pointers is undefined (therefore raises an alarm). In addition this
type information is used to prove that values are not undefined, for
instance when loaded from the memory.
Then, a points-to graph associates to each memory cell a set of
memory blocks the cell may point to. A cell whose content is not a
pointer may be associated with any set.
Finally, we track properties of the numbers contained in cells.
The abstract state domain is parameterized by a relational numeri-
cal abstract domain following the interface from figure 2. Cells act
as variables for this numerical domain, which therefore abstracts
environments ρ mapping cells to numbers. The number associated
with a cell is its content if it is of numerical type, or, if it contains
a pointer, the byte offset part of this pointer. Driving a relational
numerical abstract domain requires special care because we must
feed it with rich numerical commands, as we now illustrate. Con-
sider the following C#minor assignment occurring in a function f.
s := s + load(int32, &T + 8×i + 4)
Here, s and i are temporary variables (i.e., the memory cell related
to s is temp(f,s)) and T is a global variable of array type.
Type analysis computes that &T is a pointer whereas s and i
are integers. Points-to analysis infers that s and i do not point to
any block, but &T definitely points to the block of T. In order to
feed the relational numerical domain with the assignment, we must
transform the load(int32, &T + 8×i + 4) expression into its
corresponding cells. We query the points-to domain to determine
which memory blocks may be accessed during this load, yielding
the block of T. We also query the numerical domain to obtain the
possible values of 8×temp(f,i) + 4, that is, the byte offsets that
may be accessed during the load. Assume this query returns the
set {4, 12}. We then approximate the load expression by the two
cells global(T,4,int32) and global(T,12,int32), send the
numerical domain the two assignments
temp(f,s) := temp(f,s) + global(T,4,int32)
temp(f,s) := temp(f,s) + global(T,12,int32)
and finally take the join of the two new numerical abstract states
thus obtained.
For a memory store store(τ, el, er), we perform a similar
technique and generate a set {c1l , . . . , cpl } of p cells that may be
modified during this store, and a set {e1r, . . . , rqr} of numerical
expressions that capture the concrete value computed by expression
er . When p = 1, we can perform a strong update that overwrites the
previous value of the cell c1l . Otherwise, we must perform a weak
(conservative) update and assume that any cell in {c1l , . . . , cpl }may
still hold its old value after the update.
Concretization The types and points-to domains concretize to
functions from cells to values whereas the numerical domain con-
cretizes to purely numerical values. To combine them into one con-
cretization, the last one is lifted using an agreement relation ∼tp
(parameterized by the types information) ensuring that types and
numerical values agree and that values bound by ρ match the nu-
merical values bound by ρ′. In particular, if the value ρ(c) is a
pointer, the number ρ′(c) is the byte offset part of this pointer.
More precisely, a function ρ from cells to values is in the con-
cretization of an abstract value (tp, pt, nm) iff 1) it is in the con-
cretization γ(tp) of the types domain tp, 2) it is in the concretiza-
tion γ(pt) of the points-to domain (which means that for every
cell c that contains a pointer value with a block pointer b, then
b ∈ pt(c)) and 3) in the concretization γ(nm) of the numerical
domain, there exists a concrete mapping ρ′ from cells to numerical
values that agrees with ρ:
ρ ∈ γ(tp, pt, nm)⇔ ρ ∈ γ(tp)∩γ(pt) ∧ ∃ρ′ ∈ γ(nm), ρ ∼tp ρ′
Finally, a function ρ from cells to values can be related to a
C#minor execution state (call stack and memory state): the call
stack determines a mapping from temp cells to values and from
local and global cells to memory locations, and the memory
state gives values to these locations.
Inter-procedural analysis To analyze a function call such as
x:=f(args), where f is an expression, the function is first
resolved, then the abstract state at function entry is prepared, and
finally the function body is (recursively) analyzed from this state.
There, the analysis of return statements will compute the abstract
state after the call and assignment to x.
Function resolution uses points-to information to compute a set
of functions that expression f may point to.
The push frame operation of the state abstract domain per-
forms the assignments corresponding to argument passing: argu-
ments are evaluated in the context of the caller and then assigned
to local variables of the callee.
Since local variables are identified by their names and the func-
tions they belong to, the call chain is remembered as an abstract
stack. In addition, to be able to distinguish local from global vari-
ables in expressions, the set of variables local to each function is
remembered in this abstract stack.
Symmetrically, the pop frame operation is used when analyz-
ing return e statements. The expression e is analyzed in the callee
context and assigned to a temporary in the caller context. Then,
pop frame simulates the freeing of local variables on function exit:
this consists in invalidating the information associated to them, as
well as invalidating pointers that may point to them.
As an illustration, consider the following program.
int f(int *p) { return *p; }
int main(void) {
int x = 1;
int t = f(&x); return t; }
When analyzing the call to the function f, the argument expression
is processed and the local variable p of f is assigned in the three
abstract domains. In particular, p is assigned to the constant zero
(the value of its offset) in the numerical domain and to the block
local(main,x) in the points-to domain. Therefore, the return ex-
pression of f is known to access exactly one cell, about which in-
formation can be queried in the various domains. This information
is then assigned back to the temporary t of main.
Progress verification At the same time we transform abstract
states, we perform verifications to prove that every C#minor ex-
pression evaluates safely (without blocking) in its evaluation con-
text. In particular, we check that every load and store is performed
within bounds and with the correct alignment. We also check that
every deallocation of local variables at function returns is per-
formed on valid pointers, as well as various other side conditions
(e.g. function pointers must have a null offset).
6. The numerical abstract domains
6.1 Intervals and congruences
The first numerical domains verified in Verasco are non-relational
domains of intervals (x ∈ [a, b]) and congruences (x mod n = p).
They abstract numbers consisting of the union of mathematical
integers (type Z) and double-precision floating-point (FP) numbers
(IEEE754’s binary64 format). Treating both kinds of numbers at
once facilitates the analysis of conversions between integers and
FP numbers. Analyzing mathematical, exact integers instead of
machine integers greatly simplifies the implementation and proof
of abstract integer operations. In contrast, there is no benefit in
analyzing FP numbers using a more mathematical type such as
rationals: FP operations (with rounding) behave well with respect
to FP ordering, and abstract operations that use rationals are costly.
Integer intervals Integer intervals are either [a, b] with a, b ∈ Z
or>, standing for (−∞,∞). We do not represent the semi-open in-
tervals [a,∞) nor (−∞, b]. The implementation of arithmetic and
comparison operators over integer intervals is standard, with com-
parisons returning sub-intervals of [0, 1]. We go to great lengths,
however, to derive tight intervals for bit-wise logical operations
(“and”, “or”, “not”, . . . ). The widening operator does not jump im-
mediately to (−∞,∞) but first tries to replace the upper bound
by the next higher number in a list of well-chosen thresholds (zero
and some powers of 2), and likewise replacing the lower bound
by the next lower threshold [16]. The implementation and sound-
ness proof build on Coq’s ZArith library, which defines Z from
first principles, essentially as lists of bits; no untrusted big integer
library is involved.
Floating-point intervals Likewise, FP intervals are either [a, b]
where a and b are non-NaN but possibly infinite FP numbers, or
>. Not-a-Number (NaN) belongs in > but not in [a, b]. Interval
analysis for FP arithmetic is complicated by the various special FP
numbers (NaN, infinities, signed zeroes), but remains surprisingly
close to reasoning over real numbers. IEEE754 specifies FP arith-
metic operations as “compute the exact result as a real, then round
it to a representable FP number”. For example, addition of two fi-
nite FP numbers x, y is defined as x ⊕ y = ◦(x + y), where ◦ is
one of the rounding modes defined in IEEE754. Crucially, all these
rounding modes are monotonic functions. Therefore, if x ∈ [a, b]
and y ∈ [c, d],
x⊕ y = ◦(x+ y) ∈ [◦(a+ c), ◦(b+ d)] = [a⊕ c, b⊕ d]
This property provides tight bounds for⊕ and other FP operations,
provided the rounding mode is known statically. This is the case for
C#minor, which specifies round to nearest, ties to even, and gives
no way for the program to dynamically change the rounding mode.
Likewise, and unlike ISO C, C#minor specifies exactly the preci-
sion used by FP operations and the places where conversions be-
tween precisions occur. Therefore, the FP interval domain does not
need to account for excess precision and possible double rounding.
The implementation and proof of the FP interval domain build
on the Flocq library, which provides first-principles specifications
and implementations of FP arithmetic in terms of mathematical
integers and reals [9].
Integer congruences The congruence domain abstracts integers
as pairs (n,m) of a modulus m and a constant n, representing all
integers equal to n modulo m:
γ(n,m) = {x ∈ Z | ∃k, x = n+ km}
The case m = 1 corresponds to >. The case m = 0 is meaningful
and corresponds to constant propagation: γ(n, 0) = {n}. Tracking
constants this way enables more precise analysis of multiplications
and divisions. This domain of congruences is crucial to analyze
the safety of memory accesses, guaranteeing that they are properly
aligned.
6.2 From non-relational to relational domains
The non-relational domains of intervals and congruences share a
common interface, specifying a type t of abstract values; a con-
cretization γ to the union of Z integers and double-precision floats;
functions to abstract constants; and functions to perform “forward”
and “backward” analysis of C#minor operators. The following ex-
cerpt from the interface gives the flavor of the “forward” and “back-
ward” functions.
forward_unop: i_unary_operation → t+> → t+>+⊥;
backward_unop:
i_unary_operation → t+> → t+> → t+>+⊥;
forward_unop_sound: ∀ op x x_ab, x ∈ γ x_ab →
eval_iunop op x ⊆ γ (forward_unop op x_ab);
backward_unop_sound: ∀ op x x_ab, x ∈ γ x_ab →
∀ res res_ab, res ∈ γ res_ab →
eval_iunop op x res →
x ∈ γ (backward_unop op res_ab x_ab);
The “forward” functions compute an abstraction of the result given
abstractions for the arguments of the operator. The “backward”
functions take abstractions for the result and the arguments, and
produce possibly better approximations for the arguments. For ex-
ample, the backward analysis of [0, 1] + [1, 2] with result [0, 1]
produces [0, 0] for the first argument and [1, 1] for the second one.
A generic domain transformer turns any non-relational domain
satisfying this interface into a relational domain. Abstract environ-
ments are implemented as sparse finite maps from variables to non-
> abstract values. Mappings from a variable to > are left implicit
to make abstract environments smaller. The assign x e A opera-
tion of the relational domain first computes an abstract value a for
expression e, looking up abstract values A(y) for variables y oc-
curring in e and using the forward operators provided by the non-
relational domain. The result is the updated abstract environment
A[x← a].
The assume e b A operation of the relational domain abstractly
evaluates e “in reverse”, starting with an expected abstract result
that is the constant 1 if b is true and the constant 0 otherwise.
The expected abstract result ares is propagated to the leaves of e
using the backward operators of the non-relational domain. When
encountering a variable y in e, the abstract value of y is refined,
giving A′ = A[y ← A(y) u ares ].
This simple construction makes it easy to add other non-
relational domains and combine them with relational domains.
6.3 Convex polyhedra
To exercise the interface for relational numerical domains, Verasco
includes a relational domain of convex polyhedra. It builds on the
VPL library of Fouilhe´ et al. [18], which implements all required
operations over convex polyhedra represented as conjunctions of
linear inequalities with rational coefficients. VPL is implemented
in Caml using GMP rational arithmetic, and therefore cannot be
trusted. However, every operation produces a Farkas certificate that
can easily be checked by a validator written and proved sound in
Coq [19]. For example, the join operation, applied to polyhedras
P1, P2, returns not only a polyhedron P but also Farkas certificates
proving that the system of inequations (P1 ∨ P2) ∧ ¬P is unsatis-
fiable. Therefore, any concrete state ρ ∈ γ(P1) ∪ γ(P2) is also in
γ(P ), establishing the soundness of join.
This is, currently, the only instance of verified validation a pos-
teriori in Verasco. While simpler abstract domains can be verified
directly with reasonable proof effort, verified validation is a perfect
match for this domain, avoiding proofs of difficult algorithms and
enabling efficient implementations of costly polyhedral computa-
tions.
6.4 Symbolic equalities
The relational domain of symbolic equalities records equalities
x = ec between a variable x and a conditional expression ec, as
well as facts ec = true or ec = false about the Boolean value
of an expression. Conditional expressions ec extend numerical ex-
pressions ewith zero, one or several if-then-else selectors in prenex
position:
ec ::= e | ec ? ec : ec
On its own, this domain provides no numerical information that can
be used to prove absence of run-time errors. Combined with other
numerical domains via the communication mechanism of section 7,
symbolic equalities enable these other domains to analyze assume
operations more precisely. A typical example comes from the way
CompCert compiles C’s short-circuit Boolean operators && and ||.
The pass that pulls side effects outside of expressions transforms
these operators into assignments to temporary Boolean variables.
For example, “if (f(x) > 0 && y < z) { s; }” becomes, in
C#minor,
t1 = f(x);
if (t1 > 0) { t2 = y < z; } else { t2 = 0; }
if (t2) { s; }
The symbolic equality domain infers t2 = t1 > 0 ? y < z : 0 at
the second if. Assuming t2 = true in s adds no information
in the interval and polyhedra domains. Noticing this fact, these
domains can query the domain of equalities, obtain the symbolic
equality over t2 above, and learn that y < z and t1 > 0.
A set of equalities x = ec and facts ec = b concretizes to all
concrete environments that validate these equations:
γ(Eqs,Facts) =
{
ρ
∣∣∣∣ (x = ec) ∈ Eqs ⇒ ρ(x) ∈ eval ρ ec(ec = b) ∈ Facts ⇒ b ∈ eval ρ ec
}
A new equation is added by assign, and a new fact is added by
assume. All equations and facts involving variable x are removed
when doing assign or forget over x. We do not track previous
values of assigned variables the way value numbering analyses
do. Likewise, we do not treat equalities between variables x = y
specially.
The clever operation in this domain is the join between two
abstract states: this is where conditional expressions are inferred.
Computing (optimal) least upper bounds between sets of symbolic
equalities is known to be difficult [21], so we settle for an over-
approximation. Equations and facts that occur in both abstract
states (using syntactic equality for comparison) are kept. If one
state contains an equality x = e′c and a fact ec = true, and
the other state contains x = e′′c and ec = false, the equality
x = ec ? e
′
c : e
′′
c is added to the joined state. All other equalities
and facts are discarded. Widening is similar to join, except that new
conditional expressions are not inferred.
6.5 Handling machine integers
Numerical domains such as intervals and polyhedra are well under-
stood as abstractions of unbounded mathematical integers. How-
ever, most integer types in programming languages are bounded,
with arithmetic overflows treated either as run-time errors or by
“wrapping around” and taking the result modulo the range of the
type. In C#minor, integer arithmetic is defined modulo 2N with
N = 32 or N = 64 depending on the operation. Moreover,
C#minor does not distinguish between signed and unsigned integer
types: both are just N -bit vectors. Some integer operations such as
division or comparisons come in two flavors, one that interprets its
arguments as unsigned integers and the other as signed integers;
but other integer operations such as addition and multiplication are
presented as a single operator that handles signed and unsigned ar-
guments identically.
All these subtleties of machine-level integer arithmetic compli-
cate static analysis. For specific abstract domains such as intervals
and congruences, ad hoc approaches are known, such as strided
intervals [36], wrapped intervals [31], or reduced product of two
intervals of Z, tracking signed and unsigned interpretations respec-
tively [8]. These approaches are difficult to extend to other do-
mains, especially relational domains. In Verasco, we use a more
generic construction that transforms any relational domain over
mathematical integers Z into a relational domain over N -bits ma-
chine integers with modulo-2N arithmetic.
We first outline the construction on a simple, non-relational
example. Consider the familiar domain of intervals over Z, with
concretization γ([l, h]) = {x : Z | l ≤ x ≤ h}. To adapt this
domain to the analysis of 4-bit machine integers (type int4), we
keep the same abstract values [l, h] with l, h ∈ Z, but concretize
them to machine integers as follows:
γm([l, h]) = {b : int4 | ∃n : Z, n ∈ γ([l, h]) ∧ b = n mod 24}
In other words, the mathematical integers in γ([l, h]), that is, l, l+
1, . . . , h− 1, h, are projected modulo 16 into bit vectors.
All arithmetic operations that are compatible with equality
modulo 24 can be analyzed using the standard abstract operations
over Z-intervals. For example, 4-bit addition add is such that
add b1 b2 = (b1 + b2) mod 2
4. If it is know that x ∈ [0, 2],
we analyze add x 15 like we would analyze x + 15 (addition in
Z), obtaining [0, 2] + [15, 15] = [15, 17]. This interval [15, 17]
concretizes to three 4-bit vectors, {15, 0, 1} with unsigned inter-
pretation and {−1, 0, 1} with signed interpretation. An overflow
occurred in the unsigned view, but the Z-interval arithmetic tracks
it correctly. The same technique of analyzing machine operations
as if they were exact works for addition, subtraction, and bitwise
operations (and, or, not), without loss of precision, and also for
multiplication and left shift, possibly with loss of precision.
Other arithmetic operations such as division, right shifts, and
comparisons are not compatible with equality modulo 24. (These
are exactly the operations that must come in two flavors, unsigned
and signed, at the machine level.) For example,−1 ≤ 0 but 15  0,
even though −1 = 15 (mod 24). To analyze these operations, we
first try to reduce the intervals for their arguments to the interval
[L,H) expected by the operation: [0, 15] for an unsigned operation
and [−8, 7] for a signed operation. To this end, we just add an
appropriate multiple of 16 to the original interval; this operation
does not change its γm concretization. Continuing the example
above, add x 15 ∈ [15, 17], viewed as a signed integer, can
be reduced to the interval add x 15 ∈ [−1, 1] by subtracting
16. Therefore, the signed comparison le s (add x 15) 4 can be
analyzed as
le s (add x 15) 4 ∈ ([−1, 1] ≤ [4, 4]) = true
If we need to view add x 15 ∈ [15, 17] as an unsigned 4-bit integer,
the best contiguous interval we can give is [0, 15]. Therefore, the
unsigned comparison le u (add x 15) 4 is analyzed as
le u (add x 15) 4 ∈ ([0, 15] ≤ [4, 4]) = >
In the signed comparison case, the unsigned overflow during the
computation of add x 15 is benign and does not harm the precision
of the analysis. In the unsigned comparison case, the overflow is
serious and makes the result of the comparison unpredictable.
On the example of intervals above, our construction is very
close to wrapped intervals [31]. However, our construction gener-
alizes to any relational domain that satisfies the Verasco interface
for “ideal” numerical domains. Such domains abstract ideal envi-
ronments ρ : var → Z + float64 where integer-valued vari-
ables range over mathematical integers, not machine integers. Con-
sider such a domain, with abstract statesA and concretization func-
tion γ. We now build a domain that abstracts machine environments
ρm : var→ int32+int64+float64 where integer-valued vari-
ables are 32- or 64-bit machine integers with wrap-around arith-
metic. We keep the same type A of abstract states, but interpret
them as sets of machine environments via
γm(A) = {ρm | ∃ρ ∈ γ(A), ∀v, ρm(v) ∼= ρ(v)}
The agreement relation ∼= between a machine number and an ideal
number is defined as
b ∈ int32 ∼= n ∈ Z iff b = n mod 232
b ∈ int64 ∼= n ∈ Z iff b = n mod 264
f ∈ float64 ∼= f ′ ∈ float64 iff f = f ′
The abstract operations assignm, assumem and forgetm over
the machine domain are defined in terms of those of the under-
lying ideal domain after translation of the numerical expressions
involved:
assignm x e A = assign x [[e]]A A
assumem e b A = assume [[e]]A b A
forgetm x A = forget x A
The translation of expressions inserts just enough normalizations
so that the ideal transformed expression [[e]]A evaluates to an ideal
number that matches (up to the ∼= relation) the value of e as a
machine number. Variables and constants translate to themselves.
Arithmetic operators that are compatible with the ∼= relation, such
as integer addition and subtraction, and all FP operations, translate
isomorphically. Other arithmetic operators have their arguments
reduced in range, as explained below.
[[x]]A = x
[[add e1 e2]]A = [[e1]]A + [[e2]]A
[[le u e1 e2]]A =
reduceA[[e1]]A [0, 2
32) ≤ reduceA [[e2]]A [0, 232)
[[le s e1 e2]]A =
reduceA [[e1]]A [−231, 231) ≤ reduceA [[e2]]A [−231, 231)
The purpose of reduceA e [L,H), where [L,H) is an interval of
width 2N , is to reduce the values of emodulo 2N so that they fit the
interval [L,H). To this end, it uses a get itv e A operation of the
ideal numerical domain that returns a variation interval of e. From
this interval, it determines the number q of multiples of 2N that
must be subtracted from e to bring it back to the interval [L,H).
This is not always possible, in which cases [L,H) is returned as
the reduced expression. (Remember that numerical expressions in
Verasco are nondeterministic and use intervals as constants.)
reduceA e [L,H) =
let [l, h) = get itv e A in
if h− l ≥ 2N then [L,H) else
let q = b(l − L)/2Nc in
if h+ q.2N ≤ H then e− q.2N else [L,H)
The translation of expressions is sound in the following sense.
LEMMA 3. Assume ρm ∈ γm(A), ρ ∈ γ(A) and ρm(x) ∼= ρ(x)
for all variables x. Then, for all machine expressions e,
vm ∈ evalm ρm e⇒ ∃v, v ∈ eval ρ [[e]]A ∧ vm ∼= v
It follows that the assignm and assumem operations of the
transformed domain are sound.
7. Communication between domains
Several abstract domains are used in order to keep track of different
kinds of properties. For example, we need interval information to
check that array accesses are within bounds. We use a congruence
domain to check alignment of memory accesses. A domain of
symbolic equalities helps us dealing with boolean expressions.
All those domains need to communicate. For example, only the
interval domain is able to infer numerical information for all opera-
tors, including bitwise operators, division and FP operations; how-
ever, all other domains may need to use this information. Another
example is the symbolic equalities domain: if the condition of a test
is just a variable, another domain can substitute the variable with a
boolean expression provided by this symbolic domain in order to
refine their abstract states.
The classic approach to combining two abstract domains and
make them exchange information is the reduced product [15]. Im-
plementations of reduced products tend to be specific to the two
domains being combined, and are difficult to scale to the combi-
nation of n > 2 domains. Reduced products are, therefore, not a
good match for the modular architecture of Verasco. Instead, we
use a system of inter-domain communications based on channels,
inspired by that of ASTRE´E [17]. We define an input channel as
follows:
Record in_chan : Type :=
{ get_itv: iexpr var → IdealIntervals.abs+⊥;
get_eq_expr: var → option (mux_iexpr var) }.
An input channel is a record of functions. Each function corre-
sponds to a specific kind of query: get_itv returns an interval of
variation for an expression, while get_eq_expr returns an expres-
sion that evaluates to the same value as the variable it is called on.
This type of channels is meant to be extended when needed. For
example, one could add a query for a linear approximation of an
expression, which could be answered by a dedicated domain and
used by linear relational domains.
Like abstract states, channels have a concretization function.
Intuitively, an environment ρ : var → Z + float64 is in the
concretization of a channel if all answers to queries are valid in ρ:
Record in_chan_gamma chan ρ : Prop :=
{ get_itv_correct:
∀ e, eval_iexpr ρ e ⊆ γ (chan.(get_itv) e);
get_eq_expr_correct:
∀ x e, chan.(get_eq_expr) x = Some e →
eval_mux_iexpr ρ e (ρ x) }.
Channels are used by domains when they need information from
another domain. When an operation of a domain receives as argu-
ment an abstract value, it also receives a channel corresponding to
Ain
Cin
Aout
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C′out
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Figure 4. Communication channels between abstract operators.
Left: single operator. Right: composition of two operators from
different domains.
the same concrete environments. (Channel Cin in figure 4.) Sym-
metrically, each transfer function that returns a new abstract value
also returns a channel C′out that other domains can query to obtain
information on the state after the execution of the transfer function.
Finally, yet another channel Cout is provided as extra argument to
each transfer function. Querying this channel will provide informa-
tion on the state after the execution of transfer functions from other
domains. Only abstract domains having already computed these
function can answer these queries. In other words, the domain op-
eration produces C′out by enriching information already present in
Cout with information of its own. For example, the assign transfer
function, which corresponds, in the concrete, to an assignment of
an expression to a variable, has the following type:
assign: var → iexpr var → t * in_chan →
in_chan → (t * in_chan)+⊥;
The first and second arguments are the assigned variable and ex-
pression. The third argument is a pair representing the initial states:
an abstract value and the channel Cin . The fourth argument is the
channel Cout representing the current information about the final
state after the assignment. If no contradiction is found, assign re-
turns the final abstract state and the enriched channel C′out . The
specification of assign is as follows:
assign_correct: ∀ x e ab chan ρ n,
n ∈ eval_iexpr ρ e →
ρ ∈ γ ab →
(upd ρ x n) ∈ γ chan →
(upd ρ x n) ∈ γ (assign x e ab chan);
Here, we extend γ to pairs of abstract values and channels, tak-
ing γ (x, y) = γ x ∩ γ y and using Coq type classes. This
specification of assign is analogous to the one in figure 2. The
difference is that we add an hypothesis stating that the two chan-
nels given as parameters are correct with respect to initial and final
states respectively. Moreover, we demand that the returned channel
be correct with respect to the final state.
An implementation of such a specification has to create a chan-
nel. For each query, the implementation can choose to forward it to
the channel received as its fourth parameter, effectively forwarding
it to another domain, or to answer it using its own information, or to
do both and combine the information. For example, an interval do-
main will answer get_itv queries but not get_eq_expr queries,
forwarding the latter to other domains.
This interface for channel-aware transfer functions such as
assign makes it easy to combine two domains and have them
communicate. Verasco provides a generic combinator (pictured as
⊗ in figure 1) that takes two abstract domains over ideal numerical
environments and returns a product domain where information
coming from both domains is stored, and where the two domains
can communicate via channels. The definition of assign for the
product is the following:
assign v e (ab:(A*B)*in_chan) chan :=
let ’((a, b), abchan) := ab in
(* Computation on the first component *)
do_bot retachan <- assign v e (a, abchan) chan;
let ’(reta, chan) := retachan in
(* Computation on the second component,
using the new input channel *)
do_bot retbchan <- assign v e (b, abchan) chan;
let ’(retb, chan) := retbchan in
NotBot ((reta, retb), chan)
The “plumbing” implemented here is depicted in figure 4, right
part. As shown there, theCout channel passed to the second abstract
domain is the C′out channel generated by the first abstract domain.
This enables the second abstract domain to query the first one.
Using this product construction, we can build trees (nested prod-
ucts) of cooperating domains. As depicted in figure 1, the input to
the “Z → int” domain transformer described in section 6.5 is
such a combination of numerical domains. Abstract states of this
combination are pairs of, on the one hand, nested pairs of abstract
states from the individual numerical domains, and, on the other
hand, a channel. The channel is not only used when calling abstract
transfer functions, but also directly in order to get numerical infor-
mation such as variation intervals. When the “Z → int” domain
transformer calls a transfer function, it simply passes as initialCout
channel a “top” channel whose concretization contains all concrete
environments: assign x e v in chan top.
One final technical difficulty is comparison between abstract
states, such as the subsumption test v used during post-fixpoint
computation. In the upper layers, abstract states comprise (nested
pairs of) abstract values plus a channel. Therefore, it seems nec-
essary to compare two channels, or at least one channel and one
abstract state. However, channels being records of functions, com-
parison is not decidable. Our solution is to maintain the invariant
that channels never contain more information than what is con-
tained in the abstract values they are paired with. That is, at the
top of the combination of domains, when we manipulate a pair
(ab, chan) of an abstract value and a channel, we will make
sure that γ(ab) ⊆ γ(chan) holds. In order to check whether one
such pair (ab1, chan1) is smaller than another (ab2, chan2),
we only need to check that γ(ab1, chan1) ⊆ γ(ab2), which
is easily decidable. Thus, the type of the comparison function for
abstract values is:
leb: t * in_chan → t → bool
Note that it is useful to provide leb with a channel for its first
argument: an abstract domain can, then, query other domains in
order to compare abstract values.
However, the constraint γ(ab) ⊆ γ(chan) is too strong for
real abstract domains: it makes it impossible for a domain to for-
ward a query to another domain. Instead, we use a weaker con-
straint for every transfer function. In the case of assign, we prove:
∀ x e in chan0 ab chan,
assign x e in chan0 = NotBot (ab, chan) →
γ chan0 ∩ γ ab ⊆ γ(chan)
That is, the returned channel contains no more information
than what is contained in the returned abstract value and the
given channel. When chan0 is in_chan_top, it follows that
γ(ab) ⊆ γ(chan), ensuring the soundness of the leb compari-
son function.
The property that limits the amount of information contained in
channels is useful beyond the proof of soundness for comparisons:
it is also a sanity check, ensuring that the returned channel only
depends on the abstract value and on the channel given as the
last argument, but not for instance on channels or abstract values
Specs Proofs Overall
Interfaces 1081 139 3%
Abstract interpreter 2335 2204 13%
State abstraction 2473 3563 17%
Numerical domains 7805 8563 48%
Domain combinators 1305 1826 9%
Intervals 1489 2224 10%
Congruences 403 288 2%
Polyhedra (validator) 4038 3598 22% (from [19])
Symbolic equalities 570 627 3%
Miscellaneous libraries 3153 3329 19%
Total 16847 17040 33887 lines
Table 1. Size of the Coq development
previously computed. This is important for efficiency, because if
the closures contained in the channel made references to previous
channels or abstract values, this would make the analyzer keep old
abstract values in memory, leading to bad memory behavior.
8. Implementation and mechanization
The Coq development for Verasco is about 34 000 lines, excluding
blanks and comments. An additional 6 000 lines of Caml imple-
ment the operations over poyhedra that are validated a posteriori.
The Coq sources split equally between proof scripts, on the one
hand, and algorithms, specifications and statements of theorems on
the other. Table 1 shows the relative sizes of the various compo-
nents of Verasco. The parts reused from CompCert (e.g., syntax
and semantics of C#minor) are not counted.
The interfaces that provide the backbone of Verasco are pleas-
antly lean. The bulk of the development is the abstract domains for
states and (especially) for numbers, which involve large case anal-
yses and difficult proofs over integer and F.P. arithmetic.
The Coq proofs are essentially constructive. The axiom of ex-
cluded middle and the axiom of functional extensionality are used
in a few places, for convenience rather than by necessity. How-
ever, floating-point arithmetic is specified using Coq’s theory of
real numbers, which relies on classical logic axioms.
Except for the operations over polyhedra, the algorithms used
by Verasco are implemented directly in Coq’s specification lan-
guage as function definitions in purely functional style. An exe-
cutable analyzer is obtained by automatic extraction of Caml code
from these function definitions and those of CompCert.
9. Experimental results
We conducted preliminary experiments with the executable
C#minor static analyzer obtained as described in section 8. We
ran the analyzer on a number of small test C programs (up to
a few hundred lines). The purpose was to verify the absence of
run-time errors in these programs. To exercise further the analyzer,
we added support for a built-in function verasco assert(e) to
explicitly ask the analyzer to prove invariants that are expressible
as C expressions e.
To model inputs, we added support for two other built-in func-
tions: any int64 and any double, which nondeterministically re-
turn a value of the requested type. They are often coupled to the
built-in function verasco assume(b)2 to further constrain their
results. These functions are also used to model library functions,
whose code is not available or trusted.
2 We only consider program executions where the boolean expression b is
true when verasco assume(b) is reached.
The following describes representative programs that we ana-
lyzed. The other examples have similar characteristics and lead to
comparable observations.
Function integration The example integr.c is a small program
adapted from a CompCert benchmark. Most of its code is given
below.
typedef double (*fun)(double);
fun functions[N] = { id, square, fabs, sqrt };
double
integr(fun f, double low, double high, int n) {
double h, x, s; int i;
h = (high - low) / n; s = 0;
for (i = n, x = low; i > 0; i--, x += h)
s += f(x);
return s * h;
}
int main(void) {
for (int i = 0; i < any_int(); ++i) {
double m = any_double();
verasco_assume( 1. <= m );
int n = any_int();
verasco_assume (0 < n);
integr(functions[i % N], 0., m, n);
}
return 0;
}
This program repeatedly computes an approximation of the
integral of a function between zero and some number greater than
one. The function in question is picked from a constant array. It
stresses various aspects of the analyzer such as function pointers,
arrays, floating point and machine arithmetic.
Numerical simulations Two programs of a few hundred lines
taken from the CompCert benchmark, nbody.c and almabench.c,
feature heavy numerical (floating point) computations and array
manipulation.
Cryptographic routines The smult.c example performs scalar
multiplication. It is taken from the cryptography library NaCl.
Scalars and group elements are stored in arrays of bytes or unsigned
integers. Many of these arrays are initialized within a loop. Under-
standing that such an array is indeed properly initialized at the end
of the loop would require a dedicated analysis beyond the scope of
this paper [22]. Instead, we annotated the program to request full
unrolling of these loops during analysis, thus preventing fixpoint
computations.
Preliminary results On the examples described above, Verasco
was able to prove the absence of run-time errors. This is en-
couraging, since these examples exercise many delicate aspects
of the C language: arrays, pointer arithmetic, function pointers,
and floating-point arithmetic. As summarized in the table below,
analysis times are high. Section 11 discusses possible directions to
speed up the analyzer.
Program Size Time3
integr.c 42 lines 0.1s
smult.c 330 lines 86.0s
nbody.c 179 lines 30.8s
almabench.c 352 lines 328.6s
3 Xeon E3-1240 processor, 3.4GHz, 8Mo cache, 16Go RAM.
10. Related work
Early work on the mechanized verification of static analyses was
conducted in the framework of dataflow analyses. This includes
Klein and Nipkow’s verified Java bytecode verifier [25], Cachera et
al.’s Coq formalization of dataflow analysis [11], and the verified
dataflow analyses that support optimizations in CompCert [27].
Only non-relational abstract domains are considered, and there is
no widening to accelerate the convergence of fixpoint iterations.
Hofmann et al. verify a generic fixpoint solver usable in this context
[24].
The first attempt to mechanize abstract interpretation in its full
generality is Monniaux’s master’s thesis [30]. Using the Coq proof
assistant and following the orthodox approach based on Galois
connections, he runs into difficulties with α abstraction functions
being nonconstructive, and with the calculation of abstract opera-
tors being poorly supported by Coq. Later, Pichardie’s Ph.D. thesis
[34, 35] mechanizes the γ-only presentation of abstract interpreta-
tion that we use in Verasco. Widening in fixpoint iterations as well
as relational domains are supported, but the applications to Java
static analysis presented in [34] use only non-relational domains.
Blazy et al. use Pichardie’s approach to verify an interval analysis
for the RTL intermediate language of CompCert [8]. Bertot [5] and
Nipkow [33] give alternate presentations of this approach, respec-
tively in Coq and in Isabelle/HOL, resulting in pedagogical abstract
interpreters for the IMP mini-language.
Many of the formalizations mentioned above run into serious
complications to prove the termination of widened fixpoint itera-
tion, using either integer measures [33] or well-founded orderings
[11, 35]. The proof obligations related to termination account for
much of the difficulty of constructing modular hierarchies of ab-
stract domains. In Verasco, we forego termination proofs and elect
to verify partial correctness only.
The ongoing project closest to Verasco in terms of ambitions is
SparrowBerry by Cho et al. [13]. Rather than proving the sound-
ness of a static analyzer, they follow a proof-carrying code ap-
proach: the existing, untrusted SparseSparrow C static analyzer is
instrumented to produce analysis certificates, which are checked
for correctness by a validator proved correct in Coq. Validation a
posteriori reduces the overall proof effort to some extent. Indeed,
we use it locally in Verasco to implement the polyhedral domain.
However, we were reluctant to validate the analysis of a whole pro-
gram by fear that the resulting certificates would be very large and
take too long to check. (One of the claimed reasons why Astre´e
scales [16] is that it keeps few abstract states in memory at any
given time.) This fear may be unfounded in light of the very good
checking times reported for SparrowBerry [13]. We note, how-
ever, that SparrowBerry implements only one, non-relational do-
main (integer intervals), and that it does not handle a number of
C features that Verasco handles (floating-point arithmetic, unions,
wrap-around in unsigned integer arithmetic, pointer comparisons,
and function pointers).
11. Conclusions and perspectives
Here is the final theorem in the Coq verification:
Theorem vanalysis_correct :
forall prog res tr,
vanalysis prog = (res, nil) →
program_behaves (semantics prog) (Goes_wrong tr) →
False.
Paraphrasing: if the whole-program analyzer vanalysis returns
an empty list of alarms as its second result, the execution of the
program cannot get stuck on a run-time error, regardless of the trace
of inputs tr given to the program.
Verasco is an ongoing experiment, but at this stage of the project
it already demonstrates the feasibility of formally verifying a realis-
tic static analyzer based on abstract interpretation. Having to write
Coq specifications and proofs did not preclude Verasco from han-
dling a large source language (the subset of C typically used in criti-
cal embedded systems) nor from supporting multiple, nontrivial nu-
merical abstract domains. Rather, this requirement that everything
is specified and proved sound steered us towards a highly modu-
lar architecture, with well-specified interfaces and generic combi-
nators to mix and adapt abstract domains. Most of these domains
and domain combinators can be reused in other tool verification
projects; some of them also act as reference implementations for
advanced techniques for which no implementation was publically
available before, such as the channel-based combination of abstrac-
tions.
The current Verasco analyzer can be extended in many direc-
tions. First, the algorithmic efficiency of the analyzer needs im-
provement. Currently, Verasco can take several minutes to analyze
a few hundred lines of C. There are numerous sources of inefficien-
cies, which we are currently analyzing. One is Coq’s integer and
FP arithmetic, built from first principles (lists of bits). It should be
possible to parameterize Verasco over arithmetic libraries such that
more efficient big integer libraries and processor-native FP num-
bers can be used as an alternative. Another potential source of inef-
ficiency is the purely functional data structures (AVL trees, radix-2
trees) used for maps and sets. ASTRE´E scales well despite using
similar, purely functional data structures, but only because their
implementations take advantage from physical sharing within and
between tree data structures [16]. In Verasco, we already obtained
good speedups by preserving preexisting sharing between the argu-
ments of join operations. Going further, we could re-share a poste-
riori using general hash-consing [10].
Extending Verasco on the source language side, dynamic mem-
ory allocation could probably be handled by extending the mem-
ory abstraction so that one abstract memory cell can stand for sev-
eral concrete memory locations, such as all the blocks created by
a malloc inside a loop. Recursion raises bigger challenges: both
the memory abstraction and the abstract interpreter would require
heavy modifications so that they can merge the abstract states from
multiple, simultaneously-active invocations of a recursive function,
perhaps using call strings in the style of k-CFA [32].
Concerning the C#minor abstract interpreter, precision of the
analysis would be improved by smarter unverified heuristics for
loop unrolling, not relying on programmer-inserted annotations.
The more elegant and powerful method would certainly be pro-
vided by a general trace partitioning mechanism [37]. Also, the
nested fixpoint iterations arising out of the analysis of nested loops
can be costly. It should be possible to accelerate convergence by
starting the inner iterations not at ⊥ but at the post-fixpoint found
at the previous outer iteration. The starting points could be provided
by an external, untrusted oracle written in imperative Caml.
The hierarchy of numerical abstractions is set up to accommo-
date new abstract domains easily. High on our wish list is a domain
of octagons: linear inequalities of the form ±x ± y ≤ c [28].
Octagons are algorithmically more efficient than convex polyhe-
dra. Moreover, using floating-point numbers for the coefficients of
their difference bound matrices, octagons can infer inequalities in-
volving floating-point program variables and not just integer vari-
ables. Such a use of FP arithmetic in a static analyzer is fraught
with danger of numerical inaccuracy and deserves a formal proof
of soundness. Just like convex polyhedra, octagons also need ex-
pression linearization heuristics [29] to extract more information
out of nonlinear expressions.
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